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TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/security/apparmor/lsm.c

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  1 /*
  2  * AppArmor security module
  3  *
  4  * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
  5  *
  6  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
  7  * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
  8  *
  9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 10  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 11  * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 12  * License.
 13  */
 14 
 15 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 17 #include <linux/mm.h>
 18 #include <linux/mman.h>
 19 #include <linux/mount.h>
 20 #include <linux/namei.h>
 21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 24 #include <linux/audit.h>
 25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 26 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 27 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 28 #include <net/sock.h>
 29 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
 30 
 31 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 32 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 33 #include "include/audit.h"
 34 #include "include/capability.h"
 35 #include "include/cred.h"
 36 #include "include/file.h"
 37 #include "include/ipc.h"
 38 #include "include/net.h"
 39 #include "include/path.h"
 40 #include "include/label.h"
 41 #include "include/policy.h"
 42 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 43 #include "include/procattr.h"
 44 #include "include/mount.h"
 45 #include "include/secid.h"
 46 
 47 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 48 int apparmor_initialized;
 49 
 50 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
 51 
 52 
 53 /*
 54  * LSM hook functions
 55  */
 56 
 57 /*
 58  * put the associated labels
 59  */
 60 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 61 {
 62         aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
 63         set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
 64 }
 65 
 66 /*
 67  * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
 68  */
 69 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 70 {
 71         set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
 72         return 0;
 73 }
 74 
 75 /*
 76  * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
 77  */
 78 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 79                                  gfp_t gfp)
 80 {
 81         set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
 82         return 0;
 83 }
 84 
 85 /*
 86  * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
 87  */
 88 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 89 {
 90         set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
 91 }
 92 
 93 static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 94 {
 95 
 96         aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
 97 }
 98 
 99 static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
100                                unsigned long clone_flags)
101 {
102         struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
103 
104         aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
105 
106         return 0;
107 }
108 
109 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
110                                         unsigned int mode)
111 {
112         struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
113         int error;
114 
115         tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
116         tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
117         error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
118                         (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
119                                                   : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
120         aa_put_label(tracee);
121         __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
122 
123         return error;
124 }
125 
126 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
127 {
128         struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
129         int error;
130 
131         tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
132         tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
133         error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
134         aa_put_label(tracer);
135         __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
136 
137         return error;
138 }
139 
140 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
141 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
142                            kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
143 {
144         struct aa_label *label;
145         const struct cred *cred;
146 
147         rcu_read_lock();
148         cred = __task_cred(target);
149         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
150 
151         /*
152          * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
153          * initialize effective and permitted.
154          */
155         if (!unconfined(label)) {
156                 struct aa_profile *profile;
157                 struct label_it i;
158 
159                 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
160                         if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
161                                 continue;
162                         *effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
163                                                    profile->caps.allow);
164                         *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
165                                                    profile->caps.allow);
166                 }
167         }
168         rcu_read_unlock();
169         aa_put_label(label);
170 
171         return 0;
172 }
173 
174 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
175                             int cap, unsigned int opts)
176 {
177         struct aa_label *label;
178         int error = 0;
179 
180         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
181         if (!unconfined(label))
182                 error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
183         aa_put_label(label);
184 
185         return error;
186 }
187 
188 /**
189  * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
190  * @op: operation being checked
191  * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
192  * @mask: requested permissions mask
193  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
194  *
195  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
196  */
197 static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
198                        struct path_cond *cond)
199 {
200         struct aa_label *label;
201         int error = 0;
202 
203         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
204         if (!unconfined(label))
205                 error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
206         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
207 
208         return error;
209 }
210 
211 /**
212  * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
213  * @op: operation being checked
214  * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
215  * @mask: requested permissions mask
216  *
217  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
218  */
219 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
220 {
221         struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
222                                   d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
223         };
224 
225         if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
226                 return 0;
227 
228         return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
229 }
230 
231 /**
232  * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
233  * @op: operation being checked
234  * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
235  * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
236  * @mask: requested permissions mask
237  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
238  *
239  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
240  */
241 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
242                                   struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
243                                   struct path_cond *cond)
244 {
245         struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
246 
247         return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
248 }
249 
250 /**
251  * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
252  * @op: operation being checked
253  * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
254  * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
255  * @mask: requested permission mask
256  *
257  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
258  */
259 static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
260                           struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
261 {
262         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
263         struct path_cond cond = { };
264 
265         if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
266                 return 0;
267 
268         cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
269         cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
270 
271         return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
272 }
273 
274 /**
275  * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
276  * @op: operation being checked
277  * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
278  * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
279  * @mask: request permission mask
280  * @mode: created file mode
281  *
282  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
283  */
284 static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
285                               struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
286 {
287         struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
288 
289         if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
290                 return 0;
291 
292         return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
293 }
294 
295 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
296 {
297         return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
298 }
299 
300 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
301                                umode_t mode)
302 {
303         return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
304                                   S_IFDIR);
305 }
306 
307 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
308 {
309         return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
310 }
311 
312 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
313                                umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
314 {
315         return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
316 }
317 
318 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
319 {
320         return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
321 }
322 
323 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
324                                  const char *old_name)
325 {
326         return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
327                                   S_IFLNK);
328 }
329 
330 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
331                               struct dentry *new_dentry)
332 {
333         struct aa_label *label;
334         int error = 0;
335 
336         if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
337                 return 0;
338 
339         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
340         if (!unconfined(label))
341                 error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
342         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
343 
344         return error;
345 }
346 
347 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
348                                 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
349 {
350         struct aa_label *label;
351         int error = 0;
352 
353         if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
354                 return 0;
355 
356         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
357         if (!unconfined(label)) {
358                 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
359                                          .dentry = old_dentry };
360                 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
361                                          .dentry = new_dentry };
362                 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
363                                           d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
364                 };
365 
366                 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
367                                      MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
368                                      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
369                                      &cond);
370                 if (!error)
371                         error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
372                                              0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
373                                              AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
374 
375         }
376         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
377 
378         return error;
379 }
380 
381 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
382 {
383         return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
384 }
385 
386 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
387 {
388         return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
389 }
390 
391 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
392 {
393         return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
394 }
395 
396 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
397 {
398         struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
399         struct aa_label *label;
400         int error = 0;
401 
402         if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
403                 return 0;
404 
405         /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
406          * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
407          * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
408          * actually execute the image.
409          */
410         if (current->in_execve) {
411                 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
412                 return 0;
413         }
414 
415         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
416         if (!unconfined(label)) {
417                 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
418                 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
419 
420                 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
421                                      aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
422                 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
423                 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
424         }
425         aa_put_label(label);
426 
427         return error;
428 }
429 
430 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
431 {
432         struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
433         struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
434 
435         spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
436         rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
437         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
438         return 0;
439 }
440 
441 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
442 {
443         struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
444 
445         if (ctx)
446                 aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
447 }
448 
449 static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
450 {
451         struct aa_label *label;
452         int error = 0;
453 
454         /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
455         if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
456                 return -EACCES;
457 
458         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
459         error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
460         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
461 
462         return error;
463 }
464 
465 static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
466 {
467         return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
468 }
469 
470 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
471 {
472         return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
473 }
474 
475 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
476 {
477         u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
478 
479         if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
480                 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
481 
482         return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
483 }
484 
485 static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
486                        unsigned long flags)
487 {
488         int mask = 0;
489 
490         if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
491                 return 0;
492 
493         if (prot & PROT_READ)
494                 mask |= MAY_READ;
495         /*
496          * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
497          * write back to the files
498          */
499         if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
500                 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
501         if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
502                 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
503 
504         return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
505 }
506 
507 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
508                               unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
509 {
510         return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
511 }
512 
513 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
514                                   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
515 {
516         return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
517                            !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
518 }
519 
520 static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
521                              const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
522 {
523         struct aa_label *label;
524         int error = 0;
525 
526         /* Discard magic */
527         if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
528                 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
529 
530         flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
531 
532         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
533         if (!unconfined(label)) {
534                 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
535                         error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
536                 else if (flags & MS_BIND)
537                         error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
538                 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
539                                   MS_UNBINDABLE))
540                         error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
541                 else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
542                         error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
543                 else
544                         error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
545                                              flags, data);
546         }
547         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
548 
549         return error;
550 }
551 
552 static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
553 {
554         struct aa_label *label;
555         int error = 0;
556 
557         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
558         if (!unconfined(label))
559                 error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
560         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
561 
562         return error;
563 }
564 
565 static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
566                                  const struct path *new_path)
567 {
568         struct aa_label *label;
569         int error = 0;
570 
571         label = aa_get_current_label();
572         if (!unconfined(label))
573                 error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
574         aa_put_label(label);
575 
576         return error;
577 }
578 
579 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
580                                 char **value)
581 {
582         int error = -ENOENT;
583         /* released below */
584         const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
585         struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
586         struct aa_label *label = NULL;
587 
588         if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
589                 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
590         else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
591                 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
592         else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
593                 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
594         else
595                 error = -EINVAL;
596 
597         if (label)
598                 error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
599 
600         aa_put_label(label);
601         put_cred(cred);
602 
603         return error;
604 }
605 
606 static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
607                                 size_t size)
608 {
609         char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
610         size_t arg_size;
611         int error;
612         DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
613 
614         if (size == 0)
615                 return -EINVAL;
616 
617         /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
618         if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
619                 /* null terminate */
620                 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
621                 if (!args)
622                         return -ENOMEM;
623                 memcpy(args, value, size);
624                 args[size] = '\0';
625         }
626 
627         error = -EINVAL;
628         args = strim(args);
629         command = strsep(&args, " ");
630         if (!args)
631                 goto out;
632         args = skip_spaces(args);
633         if (!*args)
634                 goto out;
635 
636         arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
637         if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
638                 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
639                         error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
640                                                          AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
641                 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
642                         error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
643                                                          AA_CHANGE_TEST);
644                 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
645                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
646                 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
647                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
648                 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
649                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
650                 } else
651                         goto fail;
652         } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
653                 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
654                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
655                 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
656                         error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
657                                                          AA_CHANGE_STACK));
658                 else
659                         goto fail;
660         } else
661                 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
662                 goto fail;
663 
664         if (!error)
665                 error = size;
666 out:
667         kfree(largs);
668         return error;
669 
670 fail:
671         aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
672         aad(&sa)->info = name;
673         aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
674         aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
675         end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label);
676         goto out;
677 }
678 
679 /**
680  * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
681  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
682  */
683 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
684 {
685         struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
686         struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
687 
688         /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
689         if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
690             (unconfined(new_label)))
691                 return;
692 
693         aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
694 
695         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
696 
697         /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
698         __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
699 }
700 
701 /**
702  * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
703  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
704  */
705 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
706 {
707         /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
708         aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
709 
710         return;
711 }
712 
713 static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
714 {
715         struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
716         *secid = label->secid;
717         aa_put_label(label);
718 }
719 
720 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
721                 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
722 {
723         struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
724         int error = 0;
725 
726         if (!unconfined(label))
727                 error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
728         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
729 
730         return error;
731 }
732 
733 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
734                               int sig, const struct cred *cred)
735 {
736         struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
737         int error;
738 
739         if (cred) {
740                 /*
741                  * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
742                  */
743                 cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
744                 tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
745                 error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
746                 aa_put_label(cl);
747                 aa_put_label(tl);
748                 return error;
749         }
750 
751         cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
752         tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
753         error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
754         aa_put_label(tl);
755         __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
756 
757         return error;
758 }
759 
760 /**
761  * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
762  */
763 static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
764 {
765         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
766 
767         ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
768         if (!ctx)
769                 return -ENOMEM;
770 
771         SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
772 
773         return 0;
774 }
775 
776 /**
777  * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
778  */
779 static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
780 {
781         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
782 
783         SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
784         aa_put_label(ctx->label);
785         aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
786         kfree(ctx);
787 }
788 
789 /**
790  * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
791  */
792 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
793                                        struct sock *newsk)
794 {
795         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
796         struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
797 
798         new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
799         new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
800 }
801 
802 /**
803  * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
804  */
805 static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
806 {
807         struct aa_label *label;
808         int error = 0;
809 
810         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
811 
812         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
813         if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
814                 error = af_select(family,
815                                   create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
816                                   aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
817                                              family, type, protocol));
818         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
819 
820         return error;
821 }
822 
823 /**
824  * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
825  *
826  * Note:
827  * -   kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
828  *     move to a special kernel label
829  * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
830  *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
831  *     sock_graft.
832  */
833 static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
834                                        int type, int protocol, int kern)
835 {
836         struct aa_label *label;
837 
838         if (kern) {
839                 struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
840 
841                 label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
842                 aa_put_ns(ns);
843         } else
844                 label = aa_get_current_label();
845 
846         if (sock->sk) {
847                 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
848 
849                 aa_put_label(ctx->label);
850                 ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
851         }
852         aa_put_label(label);
853 
854         return 0;
855 }
856 
857 /**
858  * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
859  */
860 static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
861                                 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
862 {
863         AA_BUG(!sock);
864         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
865         AA_BUG(!address);
866         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
867 
868         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
869                          bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
870                          aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
871 }
872 
873 /**
874  * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
875  */
876 static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
877                                    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
878 {
879         AA_BUG(!sock);
880         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
881         AA_BUG(!address);
882         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
883 
884         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
885                          connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
886                          aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
887 }
888 
889 /**
890  * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
891  */
892 static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
893 {
894         AA_BUG(!sock);
895         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
896         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
897 
898         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
899                          listen_perm(sock, backlog),
900                          aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
901 }
902 
903 /**
904  * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
905  *
906  * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
907  *       has not been done.
908  */
909 static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
910 {
911         AA_BUG(!sock);
912         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
913         AA_BUG(!newsock);
914         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
915 
916         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
917                          accept_perm(sock, newsock),
918                          aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
919 }
920 
921 static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
922                             struct msghdr *msg, int size)
923 {
924         AA_BUG(!sock);
925         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
926         AA_BUG(!msg);
927         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
928 
929         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
930                          msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
931                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
932 }
933 
934 /**
935  * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
936  */
937 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
938                                    struct msghdr *msg, int size)
939 {
940         return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
941 }
942 
943 /**
944  * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
945  */
946 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
947                                    struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
948 {
949         return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
950 }
951 
952 /* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
953 static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
954 {
955         AA_BUG(!sock);
956         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
957         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
958 
959         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
960                          sock_perm(op, request, sock),
961                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
962 }
963 
964 /**
965  * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
966  */
967 static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
968 {
969         return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
970 }
971 
972 /**
973  * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
974  */
975 static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
976 {
977         return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
978 }
979 
980 /* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
981 static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
982                             int level, int optname)
983 {
984         AA_BUG(!sock);
985         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
986         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
987 
988         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
989                          opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
990                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
991 }
992 
993 /**
994  * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
995  */
996 static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
997                                       int optname)
998 {
999         return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
1000                                 level, optname);
1001 }
1002 
1003 /**
1004  * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
1005  */
1006 static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
1007                                       int optname)
1008 {
1009         return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
1010                                 level, optname);
1011 }
1012 
1013 /**
1014  * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
1015  */
1016 static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
1017 {
1018         return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
1019 }
1020 
1021 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1022 /**
1023  * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
1024  *
1025  * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
1026  *
1027  * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
1028  * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
1029  */
1030 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
1031 {
1032         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1033 
1034         if (!skb->secmark)
1035                 return 0;
1036 
1037         return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
1038                                       skb->secmark, sk);
1039 }
1040 #endif
1041 
1042 
1043 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
1044 {
1045         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1046 
1047         if (ctx->peer)
1048                 return ctx->peer;
1049 
1050         return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
1051 }
1052 
1053 /**
1054  * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
1055  *
1056  * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
1057  */
1058 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
1059                                              char __user *optval,
1060                                              int __user *optlen,
1061                                              unsigned int len)
1062 {
1063         char *name;
1064         int slen, error = 0;
1065         struct aa_label *label;
1066         struct aa_label *peer;
1067 
1068         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
1069         peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
1070         if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
1071                 error = PTR_ERR(peer);
1072                 goto done;
1073         }
1074         slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
1075                                  FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
1076                                  FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
1077         /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
1078         if (slen < 0) {
1079                 error = -ENOMEM;
1080         } else {
1081                 if (slen > len) {
1082                         error = -ERANGE;
1083                 } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
1084                         error = -EFAULT;
1085                         goto out;
1086                 }
1087                 if (put_user(slen, optlen))
1088                         error = -EFAULT;
1089 out:
1090                 kfree(name);
1091 
1092         }
1093 
1094 done:
1095         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
1096 
1097         return error;
1098 }
1099 
1100 /**
1101  * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
1102  * @sock: the peer socket
1103  * @skb: packet data
1104  * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
1105  *
1106  * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
1107  */
1108 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
1109                                             struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
1110 
1111 {
1112         /* TODO: requires secid support */
1113         return -ENOPROTOOPT;
1114 }
1115 
1116 /**
1117  * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
1118  * @sk: child sock
1119  * @parent: parent socket
1120  *
1121  * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
1122  *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
1123  *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
1124  *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
1125  *       socket is shared by different tasks.
1126  */
1127 static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
1128 {
1129         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1130 
1131         if (!ctx->label)
1132                 ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
1133 }
1134 
1135 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1136 static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1137                                       struct request_sock *req)
1138 {
1139         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1140 
1141         if (!skb->secmark)
1142                 return 0;
1143 
1144         return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
1145                                       skb->secmark, sk);
1146 }
1147 #endif
1148 
1149 /*
1150  * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx.
1151  */
1152 struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
1153         .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
1154         .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
1155         .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
1156 };
1157 
1158 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
1159         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
1160         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
1161         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
1162         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
1163 
1164         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
1165         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
1166         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
1167 
1168         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
1169         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
1170         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
1171         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
1172         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
1173         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
1174         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
1175         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
1176         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
1177         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
1178         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
1179 
1180         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
1181         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
1182         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
1183         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
1184         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
1185         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
1186         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
1187         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
1188 
1189         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
1190         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
1191 
1192         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
1193         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
1194         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
1195 
1196         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
1197         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
1198         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
1199         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
1200         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
1201         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
1202         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
1203         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
1204         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
1205         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
1206         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
1207         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
1208         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
1209 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1210         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
1211 #endif
1212         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
1213                       apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
1214         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
1215                       apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
1216         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
1217 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1218         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
1219 #endif
1220 
1221         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
1222         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
1223         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
1224         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
1225 
1226         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
1227         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
1228         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
1229 
1230         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
1231         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
1232         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
1233         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
1234         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
1235 
1236 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1237         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
1238         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
1239         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
1240         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
1241 #endif
1242 
1243         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
1244         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
1245         LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
1246 };
1247 
1248 /*
1249  * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
1250  */
1251 
1252 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1253 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1254 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
1255 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
1256         .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1257         .set = param_set_aabool,
1258         .get = param_get_aabool
1259 };
1260 
1261 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1262 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1263 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
1264 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
1265         .set = param_set_aauint,
1266         .get = param_get_aauint
1267 };
1268 
1269 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1270 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1271 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
1272 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
1273         .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1274         .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
1275         .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
1276 };
1277 
1278 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1279 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1280 
1281 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1282 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1283 
1284 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
1285  * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
1286  */
1287 
1288 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
1289 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
1290 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
1291                   &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1292 
1293 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
1294 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
1295 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
1296 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1297 #endif
1298 
1299 /* Debug mode */
1300 bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
1301 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1302 
1303 /* Audit mode */
1304 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
1305 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
1306                   &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1307 
1308 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
1309  * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
1310  */
1311 bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
1312 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
1313                    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1314 
1315 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
1316  * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
1317  *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
1318  */
1319 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
1320 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
1321                    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1322 
1323 /* Syscall logging mode */
1324 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
1325 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1326 
1327 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
1328 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
1329 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
1330 
1331 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
1332  * on the loaded policy is done.
1333  * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
1334  * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
1335  */
1336 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
1337 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
1338 
1339 /* Boot time disable flag */
1340 static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
1341 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444);
1342 
1343 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
1344 {
1345         unsigned long enabled;
1346         int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
1347         if (!error)
1348                 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
1349         return 1;
1350 }
1351 
1352 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
1353 
1354 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
1355 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1356 {
1357         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1358                 return -EINVAL;
1359         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1360                 return -EPERM;
1361         return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1362 }
1363 
1364 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1365 {
1366         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1367                 return -EINVAL;
1368         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1369                 return -EPERM;
1370         return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1371 }
1372 
1373 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1374 {
1375         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1376                 return -EINVAL;
1377         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1378                 return -EPERM;
1379         return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1380 }
1381 
1382 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1383 {
1384         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1385                 return -EINVAL;
1386         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1387                 return -EPERM;
1388         return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1389 }
1390 
1391 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1392 {
1393         int error;
1394 
1395         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1396                 return -EINVAL;
1397         /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
1398         if (apparmor_initialized)
1399                 return -EPERM;
1400 
1401         error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
1402         pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
1403 
1404         return error;
1405 }
1406 
1407 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1408 {
1409         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1410                 return -EINVAL;
1411         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1412                 return -EPERM;
1413         return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
1414 }
1415 
1416 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1417 {
1418         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1419                 return -EINVAL;
1420         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1421                 return -EPERM;
1422         return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
1423 }
1424 
1425 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1426 {
1427         int i;
1428 
1429         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1430                 return -EINVAL;
1431         if (!val)
1432                 return -EINVAL;
1433         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1434                 return -EPERM;
1435 
1436         i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
1437         if (i < 0)
1438                 return -EINVAL;
1439 
1440         aa_g_audit = i;
1441         return 0;
1442 }
1443 
1444 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1445 {
1446         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1447                 return -EINVAL;
1448         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1449                 return -EPERM;
1450 
1451         return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
1452 }
1453 
1454 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1455 {
1456         int i;
1457 
1458         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1459                 return -EINVAL;
1460         if (!val)
1461                 return -EINVAL;
1462         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1463                 return -EPERM;
1464 
1465         i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
1466                          val);
1467         if (i < 0)
1468                 return -EINVAL;
1469 
1470         aa_g_profile_mode = i;
1471         return 0;
1472 }
1473 
1474 /*
1475  * AppArmor init functions
1476  */
1477 
1478 /**
1479  * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
1480  *
1481  * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
1482  */
1483 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
1484 {
1485         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
1486 
1487         set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
1488 
1489         return 0;
1490 }
1491 
1492 static void destroy_buffers(void)
1493 {
1494         u32 i, j;
1495 
1496         for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1497                 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1498                         kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
1499                         per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
1500                 }
1501         }
1502 }
1503 
1504 static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
1505 {
1506         u32 i, j;
1507 
1508         for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1509                 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1510                         char *buffer;
1511 
1512                         if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
1513                                 /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
1514                                 buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
1515                         else
1516                                 buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
1517                                                       cpu_to_node(i));
1518                         if (!buffer) {
1519                                 destroy_buffers();
1520                                 return -ENOMEM;
1521                         }
1522                         per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
1523                 }
1524         }
1525 
1526         return 0;
1527 }
1528 
1529 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1530 static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
1531                              void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1532 {
1533         if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1534                 return -EPERM;
1535         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1536                 return -EINVAL;
1537 
1538         return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1539 }
1540 
1541 static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
1542         { .procname = "kernel", },
1543         { }
1544 };
1545 
1546 static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
1547         {
1548                 .procname       = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
1549                 .data           = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
1550                 .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
1551                 .mode           = 0600,
1552                 .proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
1553         },
1554         { }
1555 };
1556 
1557 static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1558 {
1559         return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
1560                                      apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
1561 }
1562 #else
1563 static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1564 {
1565         return 0;
1566 }
1567 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1568 
1569 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
1570 static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
1571                                           struct sk_buff *skb,
1572                                           const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1573 {
1574         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
1575         struct sock *sk;
1576 
1577         if (!skb->secmark)
1578                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1579 
1580         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
1581         if (sk == NULL)
1582                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1583 
1584         ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1585         if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
1586                                     skb->secmark, sk))
1587                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1588 
1589         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
1590 
1591 }
1592 
1593 static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
1594                                             struct sk_buff *skb,
1595                                             const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1596 {
1597         return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
1598 }
1599 
1600 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
1601 static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
1602                                             struct sk_buff *skb,
1603                                             const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1604 {
1605         return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
1606 }
1607 #endif
1608 
1609 static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
1610         {
1611                 .hook =         apparmor_ipv4_postroute,
1612                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
1613                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
1614                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
1615         },
1616 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
1617         {
1618                 .hook =         apparmor_ipv6_postroute,
1619                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
1620                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
1621                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
1622         },
1623 #endif
1624 };
1625 
1626 static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
1627 {
1628         int ret;
1629 
1630         ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
1631                                     ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
1632         return ret;
1633 }
1634 
1635 static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
1636 {
1637         nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
1638                                 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
1639 }
1640 
1641 static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
1642         .init = apparmor_nf_register,
1643         .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
1644 };
1645 
1646 static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
1647 {
1648         int err;
1649 
1650         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1651                 return 0;
1652 
1653         err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
1654         if (err)
1655                 panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
1656 
1657         return 0;
1658 }
1659 __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
1660 #endif
1661 
1662 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
1663 {
1664         int error;
1665 
1666         aa_secids_init();
1667 
1668         error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
1669         if (error) {
1670                 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
1671                 goto alloc_out;
1672         }
1673 
1674         error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
1675         if (error) {
1676                 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
1677                 goto alloc_out;
1678         }
1679 
1680         error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
1681         if (error) {
1682                 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
1683                 goto alloc_out;
1684 
1685         }
1686 
1687         error = alloc_buffers();
1688         if (error) {
1689                 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
1690                 goto buffers_out;
1691         }
1692 
1693         error = set_init_ctx();
1694         if (error) {
1695                 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
1696                 aa_free_root_ns();
1697                 goto buffers_out;
1698         }
1699         security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
1700                                 "apparmor");
1701 
1702         /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
1703         apparmor_initialized = 1;
1704         if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
1705                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
1706         else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
1707                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
1708         else
1709                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
1710 
1711         return error;
1712 
1713 buffers_out:
1714         destroy_buffers();
1715 
1716 alloc_out:
1717         aa_destroy_aafs();
1718         aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
1719 
1720         apparmor_enabled = false;
1721         return error;
1722 }
1723 
1724 DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
1725         .name = "apparmor",
1726         .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
1727         .enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
1728         .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
1729         .init = apparmor_init,
1730 };
1731 

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