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TOMOYO Linux Cross Reference
Linux/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

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  1 /*
  2  * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
  3  *
  4  * Author:
  5  * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  6  * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
  7  *
  8  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  9  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 10  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
 11  *
 12  * File: evm_main.c
 13  *      implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
 14  *      evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
 15  */
 16 
 17 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
 18 
 19 #include <linux/init.h>
 20 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 21 #include <linux/audit.h>
 22 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 23 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 24 #include <linux/evm.h>
 25 #include <linux/magic.h>
 26 
 27 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 28 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 29 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 30 #include "evm.h"
 31 
 32 int evm_initialized;
 33 
 34 static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
 35         "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
 36 };
 37 int evm_hmac_attrs;
 38 
 39 static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
 40 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
 41         {.name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX},
 42 #endif
 43 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 44         {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK},
 45 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
 46         {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC},
 47         {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE},
 48         {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP},
 49 #endif
 50 #endif
 51 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 52         {.name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR},
 53 #endif
 54 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 55         {.name = XATTR_NAME_IMA},
 56 #endif
 57         {.name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS},
 58 };
 59 
 60 LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
 61 
 62 static int evm_fixmode;
 63 static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 64 {
 65         if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
 66                 evm_fixmode = 1;
 67         return 0;
 68 }
 69 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
 70 
 71 static void __init evm_init_config(void)
 72 {
 73         int i, xattrs;
 74 
 75         xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
 76 
 77         pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
 78         for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
 79                 pr_info("%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name);
 80                 list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
 81                               &evm_config_xattrnames);
 82         }
 83 
 84 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
 85         evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
 86 #endif
 87         pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
 88 }
 89 
 90 static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
 91 {
 92         return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
 93 }
 94 
 95 static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 96 {
 97         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 98         struct xattr_list *xattr;
 99         int error;
100         int count = 0;
101 
102         if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
103                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
104 
105         list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
106                 error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
107                 if (error < 0) {
108                         if (error == -ENODATA)
109                                 continue;
110                         return error;
111                 }
112                 count++;
113         }
114 
115         return count;
116 }
117 
118 /*
119  * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
120  *
121  * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes
122  * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
123  *
124  * For performance:
125  * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
126  *   HMAC.)
127  * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
128  *
129  * Returns integrity status
130  */
131 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
132                                              const char *xattr_name,
133                                              char *xattr_value,
134                                              size_t xattr_value_len,
135                                              struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
136 {
137         struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
138         struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
139         enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
140         struct evm_digest digest;
141         struct inode *inode;
142         int rc, xattr_len;
143 
144         if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
145                      iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
146                 return iint->evm_status;
147 
148         /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
149 
150         /* first need to know the sig type */
151         rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
152                                 GFP_NOFS);
153         if (rc <= 0) {
154                 evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
155                 if (rc == -ENODATA) {
156                         rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
157                         if (rc > 0)
158                                 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
159                         else if (rc == 0)
160                                 evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
161                 } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
162                         evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
163                 }
164                 goto out;
165         }
166 
167         xattr_len = rc;
168 
169         /* check value type */
170         switch (xattr_data->type) {
171         case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
172                 if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
173                         evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
174                         goto out;
175                 }
176 
177                 digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
178                 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
179                                    xattr_value_len, &digest);
180                 if (rc)
181                         break;
182                 rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest,
183                                    SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
184                 if (rc)
185                         rc = -EINVAL;
186                 break;
187         case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
188         case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
189                 hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
190                 digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
191                 rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
192                                    xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest);
193                 if (rc)
194                         break;
195                 rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
196                                         (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
197                                         digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
198                 if (!rc) {
199                         inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
200 
201                         if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
202                                 if (iint)
203                                         iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
204                                 evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
205                         } else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
206                                    !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
207                                    !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
208                                 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
209                                                     xattr_value,
210                                                     xattr_value_len);
211                         }
212                 }
213                 break;
214         default:
215                 rc = -EINVAL;
216                 break;
217         }
218 
219         if (rc)
220                 evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
221                                 INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
222 out:
223         if (iint)
224                 iint->evm_status = evm_status;
225         kfree(xattr_data);
226         return evm_status;
227 }
228 
229 static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
230 {
231         int namelen;
232         int found = 0;
233         struct xattr_list *xattr;
234 
235         namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
236         list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
237                 if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
238                     && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
239                         found = 1;
240                         break;
241                 }
242                 if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
243                             xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
244                             strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
245                         found = 1;
246                         break;
247                 }
248         }
249 
250         return found;
251 }
252 
253 /**
254  * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr
255  * @dentry: object of the verify xattr
256  * @xattr_name: requested xattr
257  * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
258  * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
259  *
260  * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
261  * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
262  * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC.
263  *
264  * Returns the xattr integrity status.
265  *
266  * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
267  * is executed.
268  */
269 enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
270                                       const char *xattr_name,
271                                       void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
272                                       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
273 {
274         if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
275                 return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
276 
277         if (!iint) {
278                 iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
279                 if (!iint)
280                         return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
281         }
282         return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
283                                  xattr_value_len, iint);
284 }
285 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
286 
287 /*
288  * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity
289  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
290  *
291  * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are
292  * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode.
293  */
294 static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
295 {
296         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
297 
298         if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
299                 return 0;
300         return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
301 }
302 
303 /*
304  * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
305  *
306  * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the
307  * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid.
308  *
309  * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
310  * affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
311  * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
312  * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
313  * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
314  */
315 static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
316                              const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
317 {
318         enum integrity_status evm_status;
319 
320         if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
321                 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
322                         return -EPERM;
323         } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
324                 if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
325                         return 0;
326                 evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
327                 if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
328                     (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
329                         return 0;
330                 goto out;
331         }
332 
333         evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
334         if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
335                 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
336 
337                 iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
338                 if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
339                         return 0;
340 
341                 /* exception for pseudo filesystems */
342                 if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
343                     || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
344                         return 0;
345 
346                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
347                                     dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
348                                     "update_metadata",
349                                     integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
350                                     -EPERM, 0);
351         }
352 out:
353         if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
354                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
355                                     dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
356                                     integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
357                                     -EPERM, 0);
358         return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
359 }
360 
361 /**
362  * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
363  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
364  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
365  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
366  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
367  *
368  * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
369  * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
370  * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
371  * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
372  * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
373  */
374 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
375                        const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
376 {
377         const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
378 
379         /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
380          * there's no HMAC key loaded
381          */
382         if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
383                 return 0;
384 
385         if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
386                 if (!xattr_value_len)
387                         return -EINVAL;
388                 if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
389                     xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
390                         return -EPERM;
391         }
392         return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
393                                  xattr_value_len);
394 }
395 
396 /**
397  * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute
398  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
399  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
400  *
401  * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
402  * the current value is valid.
403  */
404 int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
405 {
406         /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
407          * there's no HMAC key loaded
408          */
409         if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
410                 return 0;
411 
412         return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
413 }
414 
415 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
416 {
417         struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
418 
419         iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
420         if (iint)
421                 iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
422 }
423 
424 /**
425  * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
426  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
427  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
428  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
429  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
430  *
431  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
432  *
433  * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
434  * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
435  * i_mutex lock.
436  */
437 void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
438                              const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
439 {
440         if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
441                                   && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
442                 return;
443 
444         evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
445 
446         evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
447 }
448 
449 /**
450  * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
451  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
452  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
453  *
454  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
455  *
456  * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
457  * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
458  */
459 void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
460 {
461         if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
462                 return;
463 
464         evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
465 
466         evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
467 }
468 
469 /**
470  * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
471  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
472  *
473  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
474  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
475  */
476 int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
477 {
478         unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
479         enum integrity_status evm_status;
480 
481         /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
482          * there's no HMAC key loaded
483          */
484         if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
485                 return 0;
486 
487         if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
488                 return 0;
489         evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
490         if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
491             (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
492                 return 0;
493         integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry),
494                             dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
495                             integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
496         return -EPERM;
497 }
498 
499 /**
500  * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
501  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
502  * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
503  *
504  * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID
505  * changes.
506  *
507  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
508  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
509  */
510 void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
511 {
512         if (!evm_key_loaded())
513                 return;
514 
515         if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
516                 evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
517 }
518 
519 /*
520  * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm
521  */
522 int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
523                                  const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
524                                  struct xattr *evm_xattr)
525 {
526         struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
527         int rc;
528 
529         if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
530                 return 0;
531 
532         xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
533         if (!xattr_data)
534                 return -ENOMEM;
535 
536         xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
537         rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
538         if (rc < 0)
539                 goto out;
540 
541         evm_xattr->value = xattr_data;
542         evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data);
543         evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
544         return 0;
545 out:
546         kfree(xattr_data);
547         return rc;
548 }
549 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
550 
551 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
552 void __init evm_load_x509(void)
553 {
554         int rc;
555 
556         rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
557         if (!rc)
558                 evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
559 }
560 #endif
561 
562 static int __init init_evm(void)
563 {
564         int error;
565         struct list_head *pos, *q;
566         struct xattr_list *xattr;
567 
568         evm_init_config();
569 
570         error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
571         if (error)
572                 goto error;
573 
574         error = evm_init_secfs();
575         if (error < 0) {
576                 pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
577                 goto error;
578         }
579 
580 error:
581         if (error != 0) {
582                 if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
583                         list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) {
584                                 xattr = list_entry(pos, struct xattr_list,
585                                                    list);
586                                 list_del(pos);
587                         }
588                 }
589         }
590 
591         return error;
592 }
593 
594 late_initcall(init_evm);
595 

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